Fujiki vs Marinay (art.41)

G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, 

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Held:

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

Te vs Te (art.36)

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE,

Petitioner,

 - versus -

ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,

Respondent,

G.R. No. 161793

Facts:

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and the respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.

Issue:

Whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void?

Held:

Yes, the marriage between the parties is null and void. While petition for review for certiorari was granted. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside, and the decision of the trial court was reinstated. Both parties afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage is, thus, declared null and void. For the fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations.The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.

In dissolving the marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining that sacred bond. Let it be noted that in Art. 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning.

Ting vs Ting

BENJAMIN G. TING,

Petitioner, 

- versus -

CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

March 31, 2009

Facts:

Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case

Issues:

1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held:

1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.

2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, 

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents

Facts:

Chi Ming Tsoi married Gina Lao Tsoi on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral Inramuros, Manila. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendant’s mother.  There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night.  In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them.  Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair at the living room.  Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989.  

There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in the country.  Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences. 

Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection. Dr. Sergio Alteza examined the penis of Mr. Ching that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. So the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

Issues:

Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological incapacity.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. On of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.

In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity

Ramualdez vs COMELEC (48-51)

Caption:

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, 

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

Facts:

The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections to the House of Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position) applied

to Commission on Elections “COMELEC” to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcos’s application rejected on the grounds that it did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The constitutional requirement for residency for election purposes stated that in order to contest a position, the candidate must have resided in the location for which they are standing for a period of one year or more. The purpose of the provision was to prevent the possibility of strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for office. In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had resided in Leyte for seven months. In response to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo she amended the time of residency in her application from seven months to “since childhood”. She claimed that the entry of the word “seven” in her original Certifcate of Candidacy was the result of an “honest misinterpretation”, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she had always maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence. COMELEC, after considering the petition of Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim meritorious and refused the petitioner’s original application for candidacy and her amended version. COMELEC rejected the petitioner’s application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that she did not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had registered as a voter in different places, and on several occasions had declared that she was a resident of Manila. COMELEC stated that although she spent her school days in Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections.

She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution, which designated the requirements for candidacy for election purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that she had domicile in Leyte because that was her place of original domicile and she had not acted to replace that domicile with another. She also argued that her marriage and changes of residency alongside her husband when he changed residency did not result in a change in her place of domicile. In support of that argument she claimed that section 69 of the Family Code 1988, which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile, illustrates the intent of the Philippines Parliament to recognize the rights of women. She claimed therefore that since she had domicile in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the requirements for a one-year residency for election purposes.

The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110 of the Civil Code 1950 was the meaning that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for a one-year residency prior to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they argued, had changed her residency to that of her husband upon her marriage and at the same time automatically gained her husband’s domicile. After returning to Leyte she had resided there for only seven months and she therefore did not satisfy the one year requirement for candidacy.

Issues:

Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. 

Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections? 

Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections? 

Held:

The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four against) held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court held that the term “residence” in the context of qualifying for certain elected positions is synonymous with the term domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends to return after an absence. A person can only have a single domicile, although they can abandon one domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate three (3) requirements:

1.   an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.   a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;

3.    and one must act in accordance with that intent.

Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met will the residence of origin be lost, otherwise residency will be deemed to continue.

The Court held that the meaning of “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code, which states that “the husband shall fix the residence of the family”, is different therefore to the meaning of residence in the Constitution. The term residence may have one meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and another different meaning in political law as represented in the election requirements identified in the Constitution. Residency is satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that they intend to leave a place when the purpose for which they have taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for pleasure, business, or health and a person may have different residences in various places. However, residency in the Constitution as opposed to the Civil Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to determine the domicile of the petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held that Article 110 does not create a presumption that a wife automatically gains a husband’s domicile upon marriage. When the petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband’s actual place of residence as fixed by him. The right of the husband to fix the residence was in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. It recognised the fact that the husband and wife bring into the marriage different domiciles and if the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may “live together.” However, the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it would be illogical for the Court to assume that a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband, if she has not positively selected a new one during the subsistence of the marriage itself.

The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to replace the Civil Code, confirmed the petitioner’s argument that marriage does not automatically change a wife’s domicile to that of her husband. The Family Code replaced the term “residence” (used in the Civil Code) with the term “domicile”. Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision recognised revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision recognised the right of women to choose their own domicile and removed the automatic transfer of a husband’s domicile to his wife.

House of Representative's "HRET" jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

why the court will require the plaintiff to file a bond?

The court will require the plaintiff to file a bond because it required by the next succeeding section and must be duly filed with the court before the order issues.

Bonds for judicial proceedings may be required for those seeking certain remedies in state or federal court. These bonds fall into two broad classifications:

Plaintiff Bonds: A plaintiff bond guarantees payment of damages suffered if an action is decided in favor of a defendant. The court determines the amount of a plaintiff bond. Attachment, replevin and sequestration bonds are plaintiff bonds.

Defendant Bonds: A defendant bond guarantees payment of damages suffered if an action is decided in favor of the plaintiff. The court determines the amount of a defendant bond. Defendant replevin, supersedeas, appeal and release of attachment are examples of defendant bonds. Defendant bonds often require up to 100% collateral.

Case about Yakult Ph(Salvado) vs Court of Appeals(Polo) Article 35 talks about the a person who injured by a criminal offense (reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries) and charges by the same (to pursue the medical examination again). But this time they lack of evidence that no one appeared to be a witness.

So the court will require the plaintiff to file a bond because it required by the next succeeding section to continue/ proceeds again to the criminal offense.

Lulu vs Jovita San Juan-Santos (38)

Caption:

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 166470 MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ- SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ- VILLA ABRILLE and NATIVIDAD Present: CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

- v e r s u s - BERSAMIN, JJ.

 JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.

Facts:

Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.

On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.

Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).

Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.

In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.

Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications, she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.

Issues:

Is Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and inherit a parcel of land at Marilou Subdivision formerly belong to San Juan Family? And who was her legal guardian?

Held:

No, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, 

since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. 

According to article 38 of the civil code of the Philippines that minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements