Ramualdez vs COMELEC (48-51)

Caption:

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, 

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

Facts:

The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections to the House of Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position) applied

to Commission on Elections “COMELEC” to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcos’s application rejected on the grounds that it did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The constitutional requirement for residency for election purposes stated that in order to contest a position, the candidate must have resided in the location for which they are standing for a period of one year or more. The purpose of the provision was to prevent the possibility of strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for office. In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had resided in Leyte for seven months. In response to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo she amended the time of residency in her application from seven months to “since childhood”. She claimed that the entry of the word “seven” in her original Certifcate of Candidacy was the result of an “honest misinterpretation”, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she had always maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence. COMELEC, after considering the petition of Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim meritorious and refused the petitioner’s original application for candidacy and her amended version. COMELEC rejected the petitioner’s application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that she did not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had registered as a voter in different places, and on several occasions had declared that she was a resident of Manila. COMELEC stated that although she spent her school days in Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections.

She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution, which designated the requirements for candidacy for election purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that she had domicile in Leyte because that was her place of original domicile and she had not acted to replace that domicile with another. She also argued that her marriage and changes of residency alongside her husband when he changed residency did not result in a change in her place of domicile. In support of that argument she claimed that section 69 of the Family Code 1988, which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile, illustrates the intent of the Philippines Parliament to recognize the rights of women. She claimed therefore that since she had domicile in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the requirements for a one-year residency for election purposes.

The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110 of the Civil Code 1950 was the meaning that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for a one-year residency prior to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, they argued, had changed her residency to that of her husband upon her marriage and at the same time automatically gained her husband’s domicile. After returning to Leyte she had resided there for only seven months and she therefore did not satisfy the one year requirement for candidacy.

Issues:

Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. 

Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections? 

Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections? 

Held:

The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four against) held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court held that the term “residence” in the context of qualifying for certain elected positions is synonymous with the term domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends to return after an absence. A person can only have a single domicile, although they can abandon one domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate three (3) requirements:

1.   an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.   a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;

3.    and one must act in accordance with that intent.

Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met will the residence of origin be lost, otherwise residency will be deemed to continue.

The Court held that the meaning of “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code, which states that “the husband shall fix the residence of the family”, is different therefore to the meaning of residence in the Constitution. The term residence may have one meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and another different meaning in political law as represented in the election requirements identified in the Constitution. Residency is satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that they intend to leave a place when the purpose for which they have taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for pleasure, business, or health and a person may have different residences in various places. However, residency in the Constitution as opposed to the Civil Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to determine the domicile of the petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held that Article 110 does not create a presumption that a wife automatically gains a husband’s domicile upon marriage. When the petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband’s actual place of residence as fixed by him. The right of the husband to fix the residence was in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. It recognised the fact that the husband and wife bring into the marriage different domiciles and if the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may “live together.” However, the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it would be illogical for the Court to assume that a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband, if she has not positively selected a new one during the subsistence of the marriage itself.

The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to replace the Civil Code, confirmed the petitioner’s argument that marriage does not automatically change a wife’s domicile to that of her husband. The Family Code replaced the term “residence” (used in the Civil Code) with the term “domicile”. Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision recognised revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision recognised the right of women to choose their own domicile and removed the automatic transfer of a husband’s domicile to his wife.

House of Representative's "HRET" jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

why the court will require the plaintiff to file a bond?

The court will require the plaintiff to file a bond because it required by the next succeeding section and must be duly filed with the court before the order issues.

Bonds for judicial proceedings may be required for those seeking certain remedies in state or federal court. These bonds fall into two broad classifications:

Plaintiff Bonds: A plaintiff bond guarantees payment of damages suffered if an action is decided in favor of a defendant. The court determines the amount of a plaintiff bond. Attachment, replevin and sequestration bonds are plaintiff bonds.

Defendant Bonds: A defendant bond guarantees payment of damages suffered if an action is decided in favor of the plaintiff. The court determines the amount of a defendant bond. Defendant replevin, supersedeas, appeal and release of attachment are examples of defendant bonds. Defendant bonds often require up to 100% collateral.

Case about Yakult Ph(Salvado) vs Court of Appeals(Polo) Article 35 talks about the a person who injured by a criminal offense (reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries) and charges by the same (to pursue the medical examination again). But this time they lack of evidence that no one appeared to be a witness.

So the court will require the plaintiff to file a bond because it required by the next succeeding section to continue/ proceeds again to the criminal offense.

Lulu vs Jovita San Juan-Santos (38)

Caption:

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 166470 MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ- SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ- VILLA ABRILLE and NATIVIDAD Present: CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

- v e r s u s - BERSAMIN, JJ.

 JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent.

Facts:

Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.

On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille.

Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997).

Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5.

In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties.

Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health. Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications, she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.

Issues:

Is Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and inherit a parcel of land at Marilou Subdivision formerly belong to San Juan Family? And who was her legal guardian?

Held:

No, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, 

since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian. 

According to article 38 of the civil code of the Philippines that minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements

Yakult Ph vs Court of Appeals (35)

Caption:

G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990

YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents.

Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.

David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.

Facts:

On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.

Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in an information that was filed on January 6, 1983 with the then City Court of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 027184. On October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317.

In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989 ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case.

Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made.

Issues:

Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action? 

Held:

Yes, according to rule 11 SEC. 1 Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. 

Willaware ProCorp. vs Jesichris ManuCorp. (28)

Caption:

G.R. No. 195549               September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts:

Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware Products Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris Manufacturing Company has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of the Jesichris Manufacturing Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of petitioner’s office to respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondent’s employees had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.

Respondent alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from respondent’s idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of the date of respondent’s complaint.

Issue: 

1. Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?

2. Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorney’s fees?

3. Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?

Held:

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."

From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means use dare fair and legitimate.

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Caption: 
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin 
(253 SCRA 699) 
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts: 

Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice. 

Ruling/Held:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. 

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Format of the Case Digest

Caption. 

This includes the title of the case, the date it was decided, and citation. Include also the petitioner, respondent, and the ponente.

Facts. 

There is no need to include all the facts. Just include those that are relevant to the subject.

Issues. 

Include only those that are relevant. Issues are usually framed in the form of questions that are answerable by "yes" or "no," for example, "Is the contract void?" Sometimes, students frame the question by starting it with the word "whether," for example, "Whether the contract is void" or "Whether or not the contract is void." The answer to the question has to be answered in the ruling.

Ruling. 

This usually starts with a "yes" or a "no." This is the answer to the question/s involving the issue. After the categorical yes/no answer, the reason for the decision will be explained.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinions.

This part is optional, but it would help to include them because there are professors who ask for separate opinions in recitations.